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ACCOMMODATING THE SECURITIES LAWS
TO EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
SIMON M. LORNE*
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Daniel' is a pyrrhic victory for those who argue
for a rational accommodation of the securities laws to employee benefit
plans. While the threat of liability under Rule lOb-52 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) may have put fear in the hearts of
many,3 that threat was only a minor aspect of the irrationality of trying
to govern employee compensation arrangements by laws designed for
vastly different purposes. Although the relatively narrow Daniel opin-
ion may have removed the immediate fear, the decision has only in-
creased the likelihood of continuing an unduly complicated set of rules
for coordinating many legitimate employer-employee desires within a
securities law framework.
Recent developments in the regulation of Employer Stock Owner-
ship Plans (ESOPs)4 exemplify the irrational results that can occur
when the securities laws are applied literally to employee benefit plans.
Congress initially desired to encourage the use of ESOPs. Accordingly,
Congress provided that a corporation that establishes ESOPs may de-
duct cash payments made to the plans or the value of contributions in
its own securities made to the plans and that employee-beneficiaries of
such a plan need not recognize the amount of the contribution as in-
come until actual distributions from the related trust are made to
them.5 For many reasons, these plans gained much favor among em-
ployers. Securities lawyers, however, began to ask the SEC whether
employees who received the employer shares in distributions when they
retired were entitled to sell them, or whether the 1933 Act imposed
restrictions on such subsequent sales. The answer to this question was
unclear since the sale of shares to ESOPs from the corporation typically
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had not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933.6
The SEC, interpreting the 1933 Act and Rule 1447 literally, ini-
tially determined that such shares were "restricted" in the hands of em-
ployee recipients. The SEC decided that employees could sell the
shares only in certain circumstances, for example, after holding them
for a minimum of two years. The Internal Revenue Service, however,
in an effort to effectuate Congress' mandate to aid employees, promul-
gated regulations requiring certain employers to give employees a
"put" option. An employee who received such an option could sell the
stock that had been distributed to him back to the corporation for a
specified length of time.'
That is not a rational resolution, for under the terms of Rule 144
the very existence of the "put" delayed until its expiration the two-year
holding period that must precede a sale.9 Thus, the outcome of this
internecine conflict was that the employee-beneficiaries had a right to
sell the shares back to the corporation but would have to wait an addi-
tional period before making any public sales.
While that particular problem appears now to have been satisfac-
torily resolved, at least in the most significant instances,' 0 it does illus-
trate the types of problems that will be encountered if the securities
laws are literally applied to employee benefit plans. Quite simply, the
securities laws by and large are designed for purposes quite foreign to
such plans. While much has been written about accommodating em-
ployee benefit plans to the securities laws,'I it is more useful, or at least
more hopeful, to devote some time to discussing ways in which the se-
curities laws can be accommodated to the realities of employee plans.
There is no logical reason why the securities laws should dictate the
design and administration of employee plans. If such plans, which are
otherwise acceptable to society, conflict with the securities laws, then
the securities laws, in many cases, should adapt to these plans.
That is not, however, to suggest that there is no role for the securi-
ties laws to play in the area of employee benefit plans. The securities
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978). See text accompanying notes 69-70 infra.
8. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(10) (1977); Ludwig, Analysis of FinalESOP Regulations, 1978
U.S. CAL. L. CENTER TAX INST. 381, 425-28.
9. Rule 144(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(3) (1978).
10. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 5750 (Oct. 8, 1976), [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,766.
11. See, e.g., Bermant, The Securities LawAspects 0/Executive Compensation, 1978 U.S. CAL.
L. CENTER TAX INST. 345; Holland & Yerkes, Employee h'eno/it Plans and Federal and California
Securities Laws, 33 Bus. LAW. 1727 (1978); Hyde, Employee Stock Plans and the Securities Act of
1933,16 W. REs. L. REv. 75 (1964); Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & CoNTF-MP. PROB. 795 (1964).
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laws are designed to protect investors (primarily through the 1933
Act' 2) and to protect securities markets (primarily through the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 193413). Employee benefit plans affect employer-
employee relationships and, particularly to the extent that such plans
involve investment in employer securities, may significantly affect the
market for those securities. The employer-employee relationship may
be comparable in meaningful ways to the issuer-investor relationship:
both the employee and the investor commit assets to the corporation,
the position of both is improved by the corporation's success and both
suffer harm if the corporation falls on hard times. Nonetheless, the two
relationships are obviously and fundamentally different. If additional
regulation in the employment environment is desirable, it is the em-
ployment relationship that should be regulated, and regulation should
be administered by people sensitive to that relationship. However,
when such plans do have an impact on the securities markets generally,
there is an important function to be served by securities-oriented regu-
lation. Thus, the thesis of this Article is that the securities laws should
be amended--or interpretedl 4-- in such a manner that they will not un-
duly interfere with the employment relationship.
I. TYPES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
A variety of plans have been developed to provide employees with
retirement or interim benefits. The following listing, while not com-
plete, indicates the broad spectrum of plans and provides a background
for discussion of the various areas of potential conflict between the se-
curities laws and employee benefit plans.
A. Pension Plans.
These plans are generally designed to provide employees with
some form of predetermined benefits upon retirement. Some varieties
establish a defined contribution so that benefits depend upon contribu-
tions made to the participant's individual account prior to retirement as
well as on the investment experience of the account. The different plans
are thus characterized as "defined benefit" plans or "defined contribu-
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
13. Id. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
14. While this Article may seem generally to urge a congressional reevaluation of the securi-
ties laws, it does not do so because the author is attracted to the legislative process. Many of the
changes suggested in this Article could be accomplished by the SEC administratively. The SEC's
amicus brief on the losing side of the 8-0 decision in Daniel, however, is too indicative of that
agency's general position to allow much hope that the agency will accept a movement away from
regulation in this field.
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tion" plans.'5 They may be contributory--financed by both employer
and employee contributions-or non-contributory-financed solely by
employer contributions. 6 They may be premised upon voluntary or
compulsory participation by employees. Such plans may be union- or
co-administered (a trust fund is established for union members to
which different employers contribute in accordance with individual
union contracts), independenfly administered (administration of the plan
is contractually assigned to one or more independent firms) or, in some
limited circumstances, company administered (the employer retains ad-
ministrative powers over the pension fund, typically through a commit-
tee of members of the board of directors).
The administration of such pension plans may involve both rec-
ord-keeping functions-determining amounts attributable to individual
participants, making required reports, dispensing checks-as well as in-
vestment decisions with respect to pension plan funds. Investment of
such funds in employer securities is subject to a number of different
limitations, depending on the type of plan and the type of security.
B. Profit Sharing Plans.
These plans, substantially more prevalent among non-union com-
panies and employees, do not establish a specific contribution or bene-
fit level. Rather, contributions are made as a specified percentage or
within a specified range of profits, and benefits depend on the partici-
pant's share of contributions actually made prior to retirement. Such
plans may be company administered or independently administered, and
various limitations preclude any substantial part of the assets of most
plans from being invested in employer securities.
C. Employer Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).
These plans differ markedly from the typical pension and profit
sharing plans outlined above. In ESOPs the plan's assets are invested
for the most part, if not entirely, in employer securities, purchased ei-
ther in the open market or directly from the employer. In some cases,
the employer makes its contribution to the plan in the form of em-
ployer securities rather than cash. Upon retirement, the participant re-
15. See R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON IN-
VESTMENT MANAGEMENT 598 (1978). See also SEC Amicus Brief at 12-13, International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979).
16. The plan at issue in Daniel, and the only type of plan to which that decision relates, was a
compulsory, non-contributory, defined benefit plan. 99 S. Ct. at 792. In the aftermath of Daniel,
at least one court has extended that holding to contributory plans. See Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc.,
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,880 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1979).
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ceives employer securities according to a predetermined formula or,
alternatively, the cash value of such securities. Because these plans util-
ize employer securities to such a great degree, they raise many more
complex questions with respect to the interpretation and application of
various securities laws than do ordinary pension or profit sharing plans.
D. Stock Option Plans.
These plans are not actually retirement plans, but rather are sim-
ply a form of additional compensation available at the discretion of the
board of directors to individual employees, usually in the managerial
ranks. Under these plans the employee has the option of acquiring em-
ployer securities over a period of years at a price established on the
date the option is granted.
E. Stock Appreciation Right (SAR) Plans.
SAR plans were developed in recent years as a refinement of stock
option plans to provide similar benefits with a reduced investment. Par-
ticipants are granted what is in effect a stock option, but are given the
choice during the option period of (1) purchasing the securities at the
exercise price; (2) surrendering the option for an amount of cash equal
to the difference between the exercise price and the fair market value of
the security on the date of surrender, times the number of shares sub-
ject to the option; or (3) surrendering the option for the number of
shares of the security that the amount of cash referred to in the second
option would be able to buy in the market on the date of surrender.
II. SECURITIES LAW PROVISIONS THAT HAVE AN IMPACT ON
EMPLOYEE PLANS
The different employee benefit plans outlined above may be af-
fected by many provisions of the securities laws. From the viewpoint of
the employer and the employee, the pertinent provisions are found pri-
marily in the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and the rules promulgated under
those acts. Although the Investment Company Act of 1940,17 the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 194018 and the provisions of the 1934 Act
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1976). This act regulates companies whose primary function is the in-
vestment of funds in securities; it also places controls on the relationships between such companies
and those who manage them.




relating to registered broker dealers19 are also important (particularly
to those who invest, provide investment advice or execute trades for
plan assets), they are beyond the scope of this Article and are not con-
sidered below. Because the thesis of this Article is that the purposes of
the securities laws are generally sufficiently distinct from the societal
interest in regulating employee plans as to require major amendments
to the securities laws, the following is only a brief examination of the
applicable laws.
A. Security.
Unless an interest in an employee benefit plan involves a security,
no provisions of the securities laws have any bearing on the plan. "Se-
curity" is defined in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act as "any. . . certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, . . . [or]
investment contract,. . . any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation in. . . any
of the foregoing." 20 The use of the term in the 1934 Act is sufficiently
similar that there are few, if any, matters that would be a security under
one law and not under the other.2' The term was given a broad inter-
pretation in the four decades following the 1933 Act to include virtually
any transaction in which money was given to another with an expecta-
tion of return.22 In the benchmark case of SEC v. W.J Howey Co.,23
the critical factors were whether "a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party."24 Under that theory, such unlikely interests
as scotch whisky warehouse receipts25 and gold coin portfolios26 have
19. Certain portions of the 1934 Act, primarily §§ 7-11, 15, 17 and 18 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78g-78k,
78o, 78q and 78r (1976)), regulate various activities of those who engage in 'the business of
purchasing and selling securities to or for others. Obviously, these provisions can be important
with regard to retirement plans, which by their nature control substantial funds for investment.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
21. The definition is found at § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976). See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. at 795 n.7; United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768 (1944); SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir.
1937); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (w.D. Ky. 1942); Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); I L. Loss, SECURMs REGULA-
TION 455-512 (2d ed. 1961).
23. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
24. Id. at 299.
25. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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been held to be "securities," at least under some circumstances.
In 1975, however, in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,'
the Supreme Court indicated a more restrictive approach, holding that
documents called shares of stock were not securities when acquired as a
minor part of a purchase of an apartment where the purchasers were in
fact making a housing decision rather than an investment decision.
As applied to interests in employee benefit plans, similar questions
obviously arise. The Court's holding in Daniel that the interests in the
union-administered, non-contributory, compulsory pension plan there
at issue did not constitute a "security," for reasons similar to those
enunciated in Forman, is dispositive only as to plans of that type. Gen-
erally, the question is whether the interest that is "acquired" has the
elements of a traditional security investment.28
B. Sale.
Once a security is found to exist, the second element of the analy-
sis is whether the security has been "sold." Unless the security has been
"sold," no significant securities law rights attach to the transaction. A
"sale" is defined in the 1933 Act as "any disposition. . . for value."29
The 1934 Act is somewhat broader, requiring simply "any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose, '3 0 but authorities have generally viewed the
definitions as having the same meaning."' The view of the SEC for
several years, at least with respect to the question whether the grant of
interests in benefit plans required registration, was that contributory
plans involved a sale but that non-contributory plans did not.3 2 Such a
view rested to some extent on a legal fiction, since monetary payments
pursuant to an organized plan between an employer and employees
certainly lack most characteristics of a gift. However, this view did rep-
resent a reasonable attempt by the SEC to keep the securities laws from
27. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
28. Daniel is intriguing in its rather strict view that a security must have both an "investment
of money" and an "expectation of profits from a common enterprise." 99 S. Ct. at 796-97. The
Court's discussion of the latter question would appear to suggest that a classical "Ponzi scheme,"
in which the return to former investors is provided solely from funds "invested" by new investors,
does not involve a security-a rather remarkable conclusion.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1976).
30. Id. § 78(a)(14).
31. See, e.g., Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (Ist Cir. 1968); 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SE-
cunrriEs AND FEDERAL CoRuoRATE LAW 19 (Spec. Supp. 1977). But see Daniel v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 99 S. Ct. at 795 n.8 (expressly leaving the question open).
32. Opinion of SEC Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 75,195 (1941); Letter of Assistant Director, SEC Division of Corporation Finance, I
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.51 (1953); Letter of Chief Counsel, SEC Division of Corporation
Finance, I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.52 (1962); I L. Loss, supra note 22, at 524 n.211.
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unduly interfering with employment relationships, at least where a rea-
sonable excuse for non-intervention existed and where the employee
was not making a traditional investment decision.
Under the views recently espoused by the SEC, it is argued that
the definitions of "security" and "sale" are flexible, so that the terms
may have one meaning for the registration provisions of the 1933 Act,
for example, and a different meaning for the antifraud provisions of the
same Act.3 Such a view, although not entirely unreasonable, seems at
odds with accepted notions of legislative intent.
C. Registration and Exemptions.
If a "security" is being "sold" when an employee receives an inter-
est in an employee benefit plan, the first consequence is that the trans-
action must be registered under the 1933 Act, unless an exemption is
available.3 4 Depending on the nature of the plan and of the employer,
that process can be cumbersome and expensive. It may also give rise to
substantial potential liability on the part of officers and directors and
may require disclosures that could be harmful both to the corporation
and, indirectly, to its employees.
There are two exemptions from registration available to most
plans, if the plans are structured properly, in addition to the early "no
sale" position developed by the SEC.35
1. Section 3(a)(2). For most employee plans section 3(a)(2) of the
1933 Act,36 added as an amendment to the Act in 1970,37 appears to
provide an exemption from registration. That section provides that
[e]xcept as ... expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to ... any interest or participation in a single or
collective trust fund maintained by a bank or in a separate account
maintained by an insurance company which interest or participation
is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-
sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under
section 401 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954] .... or (B) an
annuity plan which meets the requirements for the deduction of the
employer's contribution under section 404(a)(2) of... [such Code],
other than any plan ... (i) the contributions under which are held in
a single trust fund maintained by a bank or in a separate account
maintained by an insurance company for a single employer and
under which an amount in excess of the employer's contribution is
33. See, e.g., SEC Daniel Brief, supra note 15, at 70-77. The Court left this approach un-
resolved, while suggesting it had doubts as to the SEC's view. 99 S. Ct. at 801 n.22.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
35. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1498 (1970).
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allocated to the purchase of securities. . . issued by the employer or
by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or
under common control with the employer or (ii) which covers em-
ployees some or all of whom are employees within the meaning of
section 401(c)(1) of. . . [such Code].3"
The precise meaning of section 3(a)(2) is far from clear. While most
employee benefit plans other than stock option plans are of the type
covered by the quoted language, it is not clear what "securities" are
covered by the exemption,39 how important the maintenance of funds
in a bank or an insurance company as opposed to other investment
vehicles is, and what precisely is meant by a "separate account" or a
"single" rather than a "collective" trust fund.40 Although the provision
was adopted to avoid requiring banks or insurance companies to regis-
ter,4 1 its necessity is in doubt and its complexity seems clearly without
justification. At present, the general view is probably that section
3(a)(2) applies to most employee benefit plan issuances of the pension,
profit sharing or ESOP type.
2. Section 4(2) and Rule 146. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act ex-
empts from the registration provisions of that Act transactions "by an
issuer not involving any public offering." 42 Rule 146 was promulgated
by the SEC to provide greater certainty regarding whether a public of-
fering is or is not involved: a sale is considered not to involve a public
offering if made to thirty-five or fewer persons and if all purchasers and
offerees are either sophisticated or can bear the economic risk of the
investment and have an appropriate "offeree representative." 43 While
section 4(2) and Rule 146 are useful only with respect to pension and
profit sharing plans for the smallest of companies, they are of substan-
tially greater importance in the case of stock option plans or SAR plans
that in the medium-sized company may include a group of persons
smaller in number than thirty-five.
Section 3(a)(2) and section 4(2) are thus sufficient to exempt many
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976).
39. See, e.g., the discussion in SEC Daniel Brief, supra note 15, at 59-61, for the divergent
views of the SEC and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as to whether § 3(a)(2) exempts
the interests in plans granted to employees or the interest in bank trust accounts sold by banks to
pension plans. While the SEC's views are more persuasive, such fundamental doubt as to the
essential meaning and intent of the statute is remarkable. See also 99 S. Ct. at 799.
40. See, e.g., Stafford, Employee Beneft Plans, 11 RFv. SEc. REG. 871, 872 (1978). In Daniel
the Court properly noted that the legislative history of the 1970 amendments indicates that this
language was added in order to avoid requiring banks and insurance companies to register. How-
ever, the amendments at least clarified that no registration was required of such plans themselves.
99 S. Ct. at 799.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 799; S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1969).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978).
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employee benefit plans from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act. In those cases where registration is still required, Form S-8 has
been adopted to provide a relatively simple registration mechanism.'
D. Fraud
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,45 section 10(b) of the 1934 Act4 6 and
Rule lOb-54 7 promulgated under the 1934 Act all prohibit fraud in con-
nection with securities transactions. The application of those sections to
the granting of interests in employee benefit plans, to the extent left
open by the Court in Daniel, raises a number of complicated issues.
Section 17(a) applies only to the offer or sale (not the purchase) of
securities and prohibits the direct or indirect obtaining of "money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading. 4a Paragraph (c) of section 17 specifically pro-
vides that the exemptions of section 3 (including section 3(a)(2)) do not
apply to section 17 .49 At this date, it is not clear whether a private right
of action exists under section 17.50 Nor is it clear whether section 17,
like section 10 and Rule lOb-5, requires an element of scienter5 In
addition, in no case is it entirely clear what scienter embraces.5 2 Fur-
thermore, while the giving of services could conceivably constitute
"consideration" under some circumstances (for example, in a voluntary
plan) in order to bring such transactions within the meaning of the
term "sale," it is not at all clear that the services provided by one who is
44. See General Instructions to Form S-8, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7198 (1979).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
46. Id. § 78j(b).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
49. Id. § 77q(c).
50. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 795 n.9 (1979); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 n.6 (1975).
51. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in private
damage action premised on Rule lOb-5); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1978) (scienter not required in SEC action for injunction under § 17(a)); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1978) (scienter not required in SEC action for injunction under § 17(a)), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1432 (1979); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) (scienter
required in private damage action premised on § 17(a)); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544
F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (no scienter required in SEC action under § 17(a)); SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977) (no interest required in SEC action under
§ 17(a)); SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (scienter required in SEC action
under § 17(a)).
52. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-48 (2d Cir.) (reckless
disregard may constitute scienter), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
[Vol. 1979:421
SECURITIES LAWS
a beneficiary of a pension or profit sharing plan, including an ESOP,
are in the nature of "money or property" as required by section 17.
It is somewhat clearer that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require
scienter53 and provide for a private right of action.14 Moreover, the lan-
guage of Rule lOb-5 is somewhat broader than that of section 17, mak-
ing it unlawful for any person "to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary" in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.5
The volume of recent decisions56 and articles57 focusing on the ap-
plication of the antifraud provisions to employee benefit plans is suffi-
cient to render an in-depth analysis in this Article unnecessary. It is
important to realize, however, that even after the Court's decision in
Daniel, the questions are not all answered. An approach to their resolu-
tion will be considered subsequently.58
E. Plan Registration.
A final aspect of the securities laws that bears directly on employee
benefit plans in general is the registration requirement of the 1934
Act,5 9 requiring, inter alia, that an "issuer" with assets in excess of one
million dollars and more than 500 record owners of its equity securities
register such securities under section 12(g) of the Act.6 In substantially
all cases, however, the exemptions provided by Rule 12h-2(a),61 Rule
12h-2(b)62 and section 12(g)(2)(H) 63 of the statute are sufficient to avoid
any requirement that the plan or trust register the interests held by ben-
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). While the question has not yet been
absolutely resolved, the reasoning of the Court in that case seems logically to compel the conclu-
sion that scienter is required in SEC actions under Rule l0b-5 and section 10(b). However, the
lower federal courts remain divided. See note 51 supra.
54. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
56. See, e.g., Schlansky v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Robinson v. United Mine Workers, 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977); Weins v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal.
1977); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust, 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
57. See, e.g., Report, A Report to the Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities From the
Study Group of the 1933 Act-General Subcommittee on Daniel, et al. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 32 Bus. LAW. 1925 (1977); Comment, Application of the Federal Securities
Laws to Noncontributory, Defned Beneft Pension Plans, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 124 (1977).
58. See Part IV infra.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
60. Id.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-2(a) (1978) (exempting non-transferable interests in employee bene-
fit plans).
62. Id. § 240.12h-2(b) (exempting interests in common trust funds held by a bank).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(H) (1976) (exempting interests in trust funds held by a bank for a




F. Plans Involving Employer Securities.
The preceding portions of this section summarized those aspects of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts of general applicability-actual or potential-
to employee benefit plans. While the issues are generally significant
and sufficiently unclear to have generated the controversy that sur-
rounded the progression of Daniel through the courts, they become far
more complex in the case of plans such as ESOPs and stock option
plans that involve investments in employer securities, because such
plans clearly involve securities and clearly involve sales. Moreover,
such plans trigger the various securities law provisions that govern the
relationship between insiders and the market and the relationship be-
tween an issuer or its affiliates and the market.
1. Sale and Resale. When an issuer contributes securities to an
ESOP in lieu of cash, there clearly seems to be a sale of securities. '
The same is true when an employee acquires stock through exercise of
a stock option or an SAR. Generally, the only exemption available to
permit such sales without registration under the 1933 Act is that pro-
vided by section 4(2) for transactions "not involving any public offer-
ing." Pursuant to Rule 146, discussed above,65 the typical ESOP
transaction should be viewed as an issuance to the trust, a single pur-
chaser, rather tharr to the various beneficiaries. 66 In the case of stock
option plans, the availability of the section 4(2) option depends upon
the number of sales to be made pursuant to the exercise of options.
Furthermore, at least to the extent that Rule 146 reflects the law rather
than an administrative interpretation, the availability of the section
4(2) exemption depends on the knowledge the purchaser has of the is-
suer's affairs as well as the purchaser's sophistication. In the trust con-
64. In this procedure, which is sanctioned by the applicable tax laws, some no-action letters
from the staff of the SEC appear to bring the transaction within the "no sale" theory applicable to
interests in plans. See, e.g., Hurley Electronics, Inc. (avail. June 21, 1976), [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 180,637; Apparel Affiliates, Inc. (avail. Aug. 15, 1975); Lakeside
Bridge & Steel Co. (avail. Aug. 15, 1975). See also Holland & Yerkes, supra note 11, at 1735.
However, when securities are contributed in lieu of cash, such an approach seems to go far beyond
the traditional role of the "no sale" theory.
65. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
66. The issue, however, is not entirely free from doubt. Subsection (g)(2)(ii) of Rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(ii) (1978), indicates that the trust would be the single purchaser unless it
was "organized for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities." The better-reasoned view,
however, would appear to be that the "specific purpose" of the trust is not the acquisition of
securities, but the obtaining of various employer and employee benefits associated with an ESOP.
As to plans that allocate securities to participants' accounts, provide pass-through voting rights,




text, that question is probably not meaningful; in the option context, it
can be significant.67 Where no exemption is available, registration is
required, although again Form S-8 provides a relatively simplified re-
gistration procedure.68
When a plan itself desires to sell employer securities, the applica-
ble rules embodied in the 1933 Act have been strictly interpreted. If a
plan acquires shares from the issuer, public resale is not permitted, ex-
cept pursuant to Rule 144,69 since the plan would be an underwriter.
Shares acquired in the public market, however, may be resold, and
Rule 144 would apply as to volume and manner of sale if the plan and
trust are sufficiently close to the issuer to be deemed "affiliates."70
When an employee receives employer securities from an ESOP or
similar trust, the distribution is legitimately not a "sale" and no securi-
ties law consequences should attach. A sale requires a transfer "for
value,"7 1 and here the employee transfers nothing to the trust in return
for the distribution. Where, however, the employee has a choice be-
tween cash and stock, it is arguable that the employee is making an
investment decision and that an exemption from registration must be
found within the provisions of the 1933 Act.72
After an employee receives securities, either by exercise of an op-
tion or by distribution from a trust, it is reasonable to expect that a
subsequent resale will occur. The permissibility of such a sale, absent
registration, is open to some doubt. Under any theory, if the process by
which the employee receives the securities includes a registration state-
ment under the 1933 Act, the employee would come within the section
4(1) exemption 73 as a person other than an "issuer, underwriter or
dealer," and resales should be freely permitted. If the seller is an "affili-
ate" of the issuer,74 however, the issue becomes more difficult. In that
context, if the sale constitutes a "distribution," a person acquiring the
shares from or selling them for an affiliate is within the statutory defini-
67. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
68. See General Instructions to Form S-8, supra note 44.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
70. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. (avail. May 10, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,615; MEM Co. (avail. Mar. 14, 1974).
71. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra. But see McDonald's Corp. (avail. Feb. 17,
1977); Eastman Kodak Co. (avail. Feb. 23, 1976); Stafford, supra note 40, at 874.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1976). The exemption will be available only if the employer is not an
"affiliate" of the issuer. See id. § 77b(l1). The law remains unclear even in this context, however,
because under some circumstances such an employee could arguably come within the 1933 Act
definition of an underwriter, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l 1) (1976), in which case his resale would require
registration. Such arguments have generally not been pressed.
74. See Rule 144(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (1978).
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tion of an underwriter.75 Thus, such a transaction must either be regis-
tered under the 1933 Act or be made within the limitations imposed by
Rule 144.76
If the process by which the employee receives securities does not
involve registration, the permissibility of resales without registration is
even more doubtful. For the optionee, the safe course is to follow the
two-year holding period and sales volume limitations of Rule 144.
With respect to the ESOP distributee, the SEC staff appears to have
adopted the position that whether distributees may sell freely, or must
instead sell under Rule 144, depends on the availability of public infor-
mation about the issuer, the number of shares distributed relative to the
publicly traded shares and the typical trading volume.77 VVhile such
distinctions may be sensible from a policy standpoint, their justification
within the confines of the statutory language is tenuous. To the extent
that it can be discerned, it appears that if the number of shares being
distributed is large in relation to the market, a "distribution" is in-
volved. The subsequent sale, traceable to the issuer (without regard to
the time lapse in the tracing), makes the seller an "underwriter" within
section 2(11) and denies the possibility of a section 4(1) exemption. Dis-
cerning the significance of the availability of public information in this
process defies any logical statutory analysis.
2. Insider Trading. The law of insider trading, developing largely
out of SEC v. Texas OufSuphur,7 8 is far from settled.79 However, it is
generally true that purchases by "insiders" or their "tippees" in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information violate Rule lOb-5. In the stock
option context, questions have arisen as to the propriety of grants8" and
exercises"' of options while there is undisclosed public information. In
the ESOP context, there appear to be no cases on point, but the fairly
close relationship between the issuer and the trust, together with rela-
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978). Rule 144 provides that persons making sales within its limi-
tations are not engaged in distributions.
77. See Sargent Indus., Inc. (avail. Jan. 30, 1978); Sun Co. (avail. Nov. 3, 1977); Sun Co.
(avail. Oct. 10, 1977); San Jose Water Works (avail. Sept. 19, 1977); San Jose Water Works (avail.
May 7, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,196; American Paceset-
ter (avail. Apr. 28, 1977); Sargent Indus., Inc. (avail. Jan. 7, 1977); Sargent Indus., Inc. (avail. June
24, 1976); Lion Uniform (avail. Feb. 9, 1976); R.V. Weatherford Co. (avail. July 7, 1975); Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5750, supra note 10.
78. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
79. See generally W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968).
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 857 n.24 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Rule 16b-6,
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978).
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tively frequent trust purchases often made in the open market, creates
an ever-present risk of violation, particularly since the concept of "ma-
teriality" is inherently vague.8 2
3. Short-Swing Trading Provisions. Section 16(a) of the 1934
Act83 requires that officers, directors and persons owning more than ten
percent of the outstanding shares of an equity security of a corporation
that has outstanding a security registered pursuant to the 1934 Act must
file reports with the Commission upon any purchase or sale of the cor-
poration's securities.84 Section 13(d) requires a more extensive filing by
any person acquiring a five percent holding of a class of such equity
securities.8 5 Section 16(b) provides that any profit received by a person
required to report under section 16(a) on a purchase and sale, or sale
and purchase, taking place within six months of each other is recover-
able by the corporation.86 In connection with stock option plans and
ESOPs, significant questions arise about the precise definition of a
"sale" '87 (for example, whether there is a "sale" when the issuing corpo-
ration merges into another corporation88) and whether a person vio-
lates section 16(b) when a trust of which he is a beneficiary, or with
respect to which he has some form of administrative relationship,
makes a purchase or sale. Although the rules adopted pursuant to sec-
tions 13 and 16 have resolved many of the issues, their application is
both confusing and incomplete.8 9
4. Corporate Purchases. Rule lOb-6 90 is designed primarily to
preclude an issuer or underwriter from purchasing securities in the
market, thereby bidding up the market price, and then unloading a
greater volume of securities at the artificially inflated price.91 Conse-
quently, the Rule prohibits purchases by a person who is engaged in a
distribution of securities. While that concept may be simply stated, the
precise circumstances under which the objectionable behavior can take
place are many and varied, and the Rule is correspondingly lengthy
and intricate. As a result, whenever a company-related plan is acquir-
82. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in
a proxy statement context as information "that a reasonable shareholder would consider... im-
portant in deciding how to vote").
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 78m(d).
86. Id. § 78p(b).
87. See id. § 78c(a)(14) ("The [term] 'sale'... include[s] any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of').
88. See, ag., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
89. See generally Holland & Yerkes, supra note 11, at 1749-52.




ing employer securities, there is a substantial risk that plan purchases
contemporaneous with issuer sales will give rise to a Rule lOb-6 viola-
tion. That difficulty is exacerbated by the long held view that any cor-
poration with a convertible security outstanding is engaged in a
constant sale or distribution of the security into which the senior secur-
ity is convertible.92 If, then, an employee benefit plan acquires the com-
mon stock, its necessarily close relationship with the issuer creates
difficulties. While the staff of the SEC has been helpful in seeking to
alleviate that problem by issuing exemption orders pursuant to Rule
lOb-6(f) under such circumstances, provided certain procedures
designed to protect the marketplace are followed,93 there is a burden
involved in obtaining an exemption, and there are inevitably some in-
advertent violations of Rule lOb-6.
III. SECURITIES LAW INTERESTS AFFECTED BY
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
The foregoing sections of this Article have in large measure been
preliminary in nature. They have sought to provide some insight into
the pertinent provisions and complexity of the securities laws as ap-
plied to employee benefit plans, but have not sought to present any
clear analysis of how the various potential problems for different sorts
of plans can or should be solved under existing law. The reasons for
that are two-fold. First, and primarily, that function has been ade-
quately performed elsewhere. 94 But second, and particularly in a sym-
posium of this nature, there is some question as to whether the role
served in society by the securities laws is of such a nature that they
should be applied automatically, and without reconsideration, to the
various types of employee benefit plans that have been developed over
the past several years. 95 It is useful, therefore, to take a step backward
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For example, if a corporation has outstanding a preferred stock
that is convertible into its common stock, the corporation is deemed to be in a constant distribu-
tion of the common stock.
93. See, e.g., Centennial Corp. (avail. Aug. 29, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCI-) 81,320; Modem Merchandising, Inc. (avail. June 5, 1977); Inter-Regional Finan-
cial Group, Inc. (avail. Mar. 11, 1977), [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII)
81,042; Phillips Indus., Inc. (avail. Jan. 27, 1977); Tandy Corp. (avail. Dec. 19, 1976), [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,850; Computer Automation, Inc. (avail. Oct. 15,
1975). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,539 (Dec. 6, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,600.
94. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 40;, authorities cited at note I1 SUpra.
95. Indeed, the various ways in which the SEC has sought actively to reduce the interference




and to look at the fundamental purposes for which the securities laws
were adopted rather than merely looking at the precise language of
each existing provision of those laws.
Insofar as the securities laws regulate the issuance and sale of se-
curities, rather than the regulation of members of the securities indus-
try or of relationships between issuers and their shareholders, two
primary interests can be seen. The first is the protection of potential
purchasers of securities. The second is the protection of the securities
markets. The latter concern, recognized as important in the wake of the
1929 collapse, involves building confidence in the fairness of securities
markets and eliminating those aspects of securities trading that tend to
erode confidence.
A. Purchaser Interests.
Most of the 1933 Act is directed at protecting purchaser interests.
Its theory follows Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase concerning sun-
light, disinfectant, electric light and policemen.96 Unlike most state leg-
islatures, which have opted for a paternalistic form of protective
regulation,97 the Congress, at least in 1933, preferred a measure of in-
vestor freedom: the Act allows investors to make foolish decisions pro-
vided they are given full and accurate information with which to make
those decisions. Thus, the 1933 Act requires a registration statement
and prospectus containing information about specified topics. The lia-
bilities are very strict for misstatements or omissions.
Given the tenor of the 1933 Act, it might appear at first blush that
there is a proper role for the application of such laws to the granting of
interests in employee benefit plans. The anticipation of pension benefits
has become a sufficiently important aspect of total compensation that
an employee given different employment opportunities will indeed con-
sider a comparison of their retirement programs. At the key executive
level, stock option plans and the like can also be a significant determi-
nant in an individual's decision regarding employment. An employee's
interest in a pension plan is certainly related to an investment decision,
despite what the Supreme Court may have said in Daniel.98 Given the
importance of the typical employee's retirement anticipations, and the
amount of labor that the employee will offer to the employer in order to
96. "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." L. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BAN ERS USE IT 62 (1914).
97. See J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 15 (1971).
98. "T]he type of pension plan at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of
financial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate." 99 S. Ct. at 800.
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achieve such benefits, it is probable that the employee's "investment"
in a retirement plan is among the most significant investments he or she
will make in a lifetime. Certainly one can argue that if Corporation A
offers a defined benefit plan with $500 per month pension while
Corporation B offers a similar plan with $400 per month pension, it
may be pertinent to a potential employee that Corporation A is on the
verge of bankruptcy while Corporation B is not.
With respect to the antifraud provisions the argument is even
stronger. Even if an affirmative disclosure document in the nature of a
prospectus is not required, employers should not be entitled to make an
untrue statement of a material fact or to state a half-truth. However, as
the Court noted in Daniel,99 that argument may assume too much. For
although the securities laws have been properly extended to reach unu-
sual as well as typical investments, there remains an ambiguous distinc-
tion between truly investment-oriented decisions and decisions
primarily related to other purposes. The purchase of a residence, for
example, can certainly be characterized as an "investment." However,
one would not reasonably expect all real estate developers to provide
home purchasers with a full description of the developer's business in
order to enable the purchaser to evaluate the corporation's ability to
respond in damages if the house turns out to have been poorly built.
The purchase of an automobile can be characterized as an investment
without any difficulty, and yet one would not rationally suggest the
general application of the securities laws to automobile dealers. In
short, any transaction in which one party parts with some form of con-
sideration, monetary or otherwise, in exchange for something that is
not consumed in the reasonably immediate future can be characterized
as an "investment" without offending relevant court decisions.
While it may be true that a large number of transactions in which
an individual participates during his or her lifetime can be character-
ized as investments, it is not at all clear that all of those transactions
should be subject to the securities laws. One cannot rationally argue for
the right to commit fraud; however, the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
rules promulgated thereunder do not stand naked. They were adopted
with reference to traditional investment decisions and they stand
against a background of forty-five years of judicial and administrative
determination. What is considered "fraud" for purposes of Rule lOb-
5100 in an industry of peculiar and unique importance to the national
economy may well be beyond the commonly accepted view of fraud.
99. Id. at 797.
100. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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Indeed, were that not true, securities law concepts of fraud could be
eliminated and reliance happily placed upon traditional common law
notions.
Thus, to argue that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
should not apply to typical employee benefit plans is not to argue for
the permissibility of fraud, but merely to assert that the highly special-
ized meaning of the term "fraud" that has developed in the securities
law field should not apply to transactions that the securities laws were
not written to cover. To some extent, the adoption of ERISA recognizes
this premise.1 While the SEC may be correct in asserting that ERISA
did not preempt the securities laws, it seems clear that Congress per-
ceived that a vacuum existed, and Congress drafted and passed ERISA
to fill that vacuum. If the securities laws apply generally to employee
benefit plans of any type, the vacuum, which Congress sought to fill,
was not a real vacuum at all.
The same difficulty that the Supreme Court faced in the line of
cases beginning with SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 1 2 and ex-
tending through Daniel remains: namely, determining the real meaning
of an "investment contract." It is not enough to talk about the efforts of
others, because increases in housing prices or in the value of
automobiles or works of art are primarily through the efforts of others
and not through the efforts of the owner. Perhaps, as the Court sug-
gested in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,10 3 the inquiry
should not be whether the contract can properly be characterized as an
investment contract, but rather whether the decisional process can be
characterized as the sort of process to which the securities laws were
addressed." To pose that question is not, of course, to answer it, and
unfortunately, there is no clearer solution than the one the Court has
been able to generate. It can at least be suggested, however, that the
extension of Daniel beyond the relatively limited scope suggested by
the Court1 05-- its application only to non-contributory, compulsory
pension plans-is not unreasonable 106
Fundamentally, employment decisions are not investment deci-
sions. The employee who accepts a job on an assembly line may be
acquiring an interest in a pension plan, but he is not making an invest-
101. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 801-02 (1979).
102. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
103. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
104. Id. at 858.
105. 99 S. Ct. at 802.
106. At least one federal district court has already extended Daniel to contributory plans.
Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,880
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1979).
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ment in the pension plan assets in the sense to which the securities laws
were addressed. Of the various types of employee benefit plans outlined
earlier in this Article, 117 the only ones that truly involve typical invest-
ment decisions, as the Court implied in Daniel,0 8 are voluntary, con-
tributory plans that give an employee the choice of receiving cash or
stock in distribution from a trust and those involving the exercise of a
stock option.'°9 The last of these, usually exercised when there is a sub-
stantial discrepancy between exercise price and market price, becomes
a significant investment decision only because of incentives to retain
the stock for a significant period of time after exercise.
B. Market Interests.
To the extent that provisions of the securities laws address market
interests rather than purchaser interests, conclusions must be quite dif-
ferent. Regardless of whether an employee is making an investment
decision, if the structure of the employee benefit plan has actual or po-
tential significant impact upon securities markets, there is a clear basis
for the application of the securities laws.1'0 With regard to the large
majority of pension plans that do not involve investment in employer
securities little need be said here. While substantial securities law ques-
tions pertain to the trading practices of such plans, they are little differ-
ent in nature from questions generally pertinent to the activities of
pooled investment funds. With respect to plans that do involve em-
ployer securities, primarily ESOPs, stock option plans and the like, the
unique ways in which there will be a general market impact justify
application of the securities laws.
To assert, however, that there is a legitimate role for the securities
laws is not to concede that the securities law provisions that now serve
market-oriented interests should be inflexibly applied to employee ben-
107. See Part I supra.
108. 99 S. Ct. at 801.
109. To some extent, although with slightly more limited focus and some potential continued
confusion, such an approach was proposed in S. 3017, introduced May 1, 1978. S. 3017, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in Joint Hearings on S. 3017 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Human Resources and the Subcomm on Private Pension Plans and Employee
Fringe Benefts ofthe Senate Comm on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). Section 274 would
amend § 514 of ERISA to provide an expansion of the ERISA preemption provisions that would
preclude viewing interests in employee benefit plans, other than voluntary eligible individual ac-
count plans, as securities under the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act or state securities laws.
110. Certain provisions of the securities laws are designed to protect not the immediate inves-
tor but the integrity of the market itself. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) and Rule l0b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) (prevention of market manipulation); 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976) (short-
swing trading by substantial shareholders). These provisions should be applied as fully to em-
ployee benefit plans as to other investors in the market.
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efit plans involving significant investments in employer securities. The
application of the securities laws to such plans is labyrinthian and cre-
ates substantial burdens for corporate lawyers and SEC staff, not to
mention substantial legal expenses for employers. In large measure,
this situation is the result of the existing statutes and not of any over-
zealous behavior at the Commission. Rationalizing that irrational sys-
tem, which will likely require statutory amendment, should benefit all
concerned.
IV. A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS TO EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
As noted above, the registration and antifraud provisions of the
securities laws should be applicable to employee benefit plans only in
very limited circumstances.' Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act provides
a general exemption from the registration provisions of that act for
most such plans, but its application is at best unclear.
Interpretations of section 3(a)(2) range from the view of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (which was supported by the
Court 12)-that it covers only the interests in funds sold by banks and
insurance companies to pension plans' 13 -to the view that it embraces
not only the employee's interest in a plan but also the distribution of
employer securities to the employee.I 4 Furthermore, the section makes
unsatisfactory and unreasonable distinctions. For example, it may be
appropriate to establish some minimum degree of independence be-
tween the employer and the keeper of the plan assets. But it is not use-
ful-as section 3(a)(2) does-to generate questions about single rather
than collective trust funds or to create technical barriers to the availa-
bility of the exemption. The alternative exemption--the "no sale"
fiction-may once have been useful, but has now been exposed and
cannot withstand scrutiny.' 15 A thorough revision of section 3(a)(2) and
a concomitant reexamination of the antifraud provisions would be use-
ful in order to clarify when required disclosure under the securities
laws can serve a meaningful function and when the extraordinary se-
curities law notion of fraud should be applied. The author's views on
those questions have been expressed above." 6
The proper role of the market-oriented concerns of the securities
111. See text accompanying notes 34-58 supra.
112. 99 S. Ct. at 799.
113. See SEC Daniel Brief, supra note 15, at 60-61.
114. See Washing, Resales Under Qualffed Plans, 9 REv. SEC. REG. 955 (1976).
115. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
116. See text accompanying notes 36-41, 45-58 supra.
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laws that relate to plans that invest in employer securities cannot be
determined so easily. Those provisions are found primarily in the resale
provisions of Rule 144,117 the insider trading proscription of Rule lOb-
5,118 the short-swing sale provisions of section 16119 and the purchase
restrictions of Rule lOb-6.112
A. The Sale of Employer Securities.
The staff of the Commission has, with explicit Commission ap-
proval, adopted the general position that when employer securities are
distributed to employees from an employee benefit trust they may
thereafter be sold by the participants without compliance with the reg-
istration provisions of the 1933 Act so long as two conditions are met.
First, there must be generally available public information regarding
the issuer. Second, the number of shares in the plan and of any partici-
pant's interest therein must be relatively small in relation to the
number of shares in the market."' While this is certainly not the first
time the SEC has imposed extra-legal conditions on its willingness to
agree with a legitimate request through the no-action procedure, that
does not make it any more appropriate. 122 Particularly at a time when
legislative proposals are under consideration to clarify the relationship
between employee plans and the securities laws,123 it would seem ap-
propriate to examine the pertinent considerations and to propose statu-
tory amendments responsive to those considerations.
These transactions primarily involve plans in the nature of ESOPs.
The difficulty with ESOPs is that they have been adopted by large cor-
porations with securities listed on national securities exchanges as well
as by small, privately-held "family" corporations. There is no policy
basis for precluding employees who receive shares of corporations of
the former type from disposing of those shares, since by the nature of
such corporations-and the laws already applicable to them-there is
available to potential purchasers a substantial quantity of information
about the issuer. There is no reason for employee sales to trigger a re-
quirement that information already available to the public be assem-
bled in a new disclosure document. There is, however, reasonable basis
for concern with respect to the small, privately-held family corpora-
117. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
118. Id. §240.lOb-5.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1978).
121. See Securities Act Release No. 5750, supra note 10.
122. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
123. See S. 3017, supra note 109. Also see S. 209, introduced Jan. 24, 1979, after the Daniel
decision. S. 209, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. Rnc. S560 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979).
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tions. There is little available information about such corporations, and
trading in their shares simply should not commence absent the public
disclosure of information. Similarly, concern for the stability of mar-
kets suggests the reasonableness of concern with the volume of securi-
ties that might suddenly be placed on the market.
It is not clear, however, that the policy view espoused by the SEC
in its no-action letters is required. Trading without adequate public in-
formation is a far more general concern than trading shares received
from employee plans. Some years ago, in response to such general con-
cerns, the SEC adopted Rule 15c2-11 under the 1934 Act.124 When
Rule 144 was adopted it specifically embraced the concept of Rule
15c2-11, requiring that the Rule 15c2-11 information be available at
least prior to sales pursuant to Rule 144.125 Rule 15c2-11 provides that
brokers cannot commence making a market in a security unless there is
publicly available the information specified in that rule, which would
appear to be entitled to a presumption that it is sufficient to ensure fair
trading markets. If Rule 15c2-11 solves the problem to which it was
directed, there need be little concern with the disposition of shares re-
ceived on distribution from employee plans. Certainly there could be
isolated trades but no trading market could suddenly develop. It is not
sensible to allow isolated trades to shape significant policy decisions. If,
on the other hand, Rule 15c2-11 is not viewed as providing adequate
protection, then that is the rule to which attention should be directed.
With respect to volume concerns, resolution of the problem is
more difficult. Other than in the context of determining when a "distri-
bution" is taking place, for the purpose of deciding whether a person is
a statutory underwriter, no provision of the securities laws gives the
SEC jurisdiction over such questions. The volume levels discussed in
the ESOP no-action letters do not consider that issue. Yet it is certainly
true that significant increases in the number of shares brought to the
market for sale can create a substantial short-term disequilibrium.
While the recent amendment to the volume limitations of Rule 144126
might suggest a lessened concern with this issue, it remains of signifi-
cant interest. Given the statutory limitations, the SEC's only solution
may be to trust the sellers' self-interest in not unnecessarily depressing
the market, in order to focus on the regulation of brokers (as it did in
Rule 15c2-1 1) or to seek statutory authority to cope with the concerns it
senses. Obtaining such a statutory amendment should require a signifi-
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1971).
125. Rule 144(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(2) (1978).
126. Securities Act Release No. 5979 (Sept. 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 81,731.
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cant showing of need.
B. Section 16(b).
The difficulties posed by section 16(b) with respect to plans invest-
ing in employer securities are complex and border on the irrational.
For example, if an officer or a director of a corporation is also on the
administrative committee of a benefit plan that purchases employer se-
curities as its only raison d'etre, it is not clear whether the officer or
director has "purchased" so that any personal sale by that individual
within six months before or after the plan purchase is subject to the
section 16(b) limitations. If the individual is not a trustee but is a mem-
ber of the board administration committee that administers the ESOP,
it is not clear whether such transactions are purchases by the individ-
ual. While the rules promulgated pursuant to section 16 answer some of
these questions, 127 and various other questions are discussed in a
number of no-action letters,128 the law and procedures are far from
comprehensive. It is not clear, at least with respect to no-action letters,
that the SEC's determinations are binding upon private plaintiffs who
bring a section 16(b) action on behalf of the corporation.12 9
It is useful again to look at the broad purposes of section 16(b)
rather than trying to focus on specific materials existing under present
law. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act was adopted by Congress as much to
increase general faith in the fairness of the securities markets as to
eliminate the evil of "insider" trading. 130 If the latter concern were the
basis for section 16(b), the test would appropriately be something other
than a short-swing test since the evils of insider trading can and do exist
with any purchase or sale whether or not it is matched by an offsetting
transaction within six months. Furthermore, it is probably true that
with few exceptions the typical violator of the section is not the execu-
tive who intentionally abuses his inside position but rather the execu-
127. See, ag., Rule 16a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (1978); Rule 16a-10, id. § 240.16a-10; Rule
16b-3, Id. § 240.16b-3.
128. See, e.g., American Pacesetter (avail. Apr. 28, 1977); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. (avail.
Mar. 17, 1977); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. (avail. Oct. 8, 1976); First Wisconsin Bankshares
Corp. (avail. Dec. 16, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,997. See
also Miller, Employee Compensation Plans-Federal Securities Laws Developments, 2 NINTH ANN.
INST. ON SEc. REo. 1025, 1053-60 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Lowe's Companies (avail. Mar. 15, 1978) (advising that no action would be
taken if officers did not file reports in reliance upon Rule 16a-8(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(d)(3)
(1978), but noting that the application of that rule to the issue in question "is not entirely free from
doubt" and then indicating that the availablity of Rule 16a-10 (which exempts from § 16(b) liabil-
ity any transactions exempt from the § 16(a) reporting obligations) was similarly in doubt).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin I1A, PL 2C Bus. ORGA-
NIZATIONS-SEC. REG. 5-15 (1971).
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tive or other person who inadvertently violates the section with no
improper intent. This is no doubt true to an even greater extent in the
case of the officer or director who has some relation to an employee
benefit plan that could cause him or her to be deemed to have acquired
interests in shares held by the plan.
Consequently, it is appropriate to clarify under section 16(b) that a
purchase made by an employee benefit plan is not to be considered a
purchase by any individual participant, any member of the board of
directors or any member of a committee of the board charged with ad-
ministration of the plan. Such transactions simply do not raise the diffi-
culties to which section 16(b) is directed.
Furthermore, it is appropriate to exempt purchases pursuant to
stock options from section 16(b) liability when the option was granted
more than six months prior to exercise.'31 Certainly, it is possible to
envision inappropriate transactions involving the exercise of a stock
option and the immediate sale by an insider who is aware of adverse
inside information and knows that the market price is likely to decline
substantially. However, the wrong in that situation is unrelated to the
exercise of the stock option-which may well have been granted years
before-and is precisely the kind of abuse to which Rule lOb-5 is di-
rected. There is no reason to make the burden on that officer any
lighter or any heavier than the burden on an officer who had exercised
his stock option more than six months before selling on the basis of
such inside information. While such concerns should terhaps not be
sufficient to remove stock option exercises from the reach of section 16,
they become more important in conjunction with the confusion that
arises as a result of the unclear state of the law.
C. Insider Trading.
To suggest the large-scale removal of employee plans from the
short-swing liability provisions of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act is not to
suggest that abuses cannot occur. The insider trading restrictions that
have arisen as a result of actions under Rule lOb-5, primarily SEC en-
forcement actions, are important safeguards to the appearance of fair
securities markets. However, given the difficulties faced by corporate
insiders in determining materiality, and the inevitably close relation-
ship between corporations and their employee plans, it would be useful
for the SEC to sanction, through a release, some procedure by which an
employee plan that regularly purchases or sells employer securities
131. Present Rule 16b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978), does limit, but does not eliminate,
liability in such instances.
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might reasonably safeguard itself in making such transactions. 32
D. Rule lob-6.
The law surrounding Rule lOb-6 is among the most complicated to
be found in the entire securities area. The current practice of the SEC
with respect to employee plans that acquire employer securities and
that have potential Rule lOb-6 difficulties is to grant an exemption
from the rule if the issuer or the plan agrees to make all such purchases
according to specified procedures taken from former proposed Rule
13e-2.133 This practice suffers from two flaws. First, there is again the
use of leverage to accomplish policy goals that are quite distinct from
the purposes served by the rule. Second, and of greater significance,
these procedures will be applied to employee plans discriminatorily,
since their application depends solely upon whether Rule lOb-6 would
otherwise apply. If there is no reason for the application of Rule lOb-6,
then there is no basis for forcing the plan to follow such restrictions in
its purchases. If such procedures are important, then under section
13(e) they should be adopted with respect to all employee plans that
purchase employer securities. If they are not important, they should not
be applied at all. To require some corporations to follow these proce-
dures because they have an outstanding convertible security and to per-
mit them to avoid the procedures if they redeem the convertible
security seems absurd.
V. CONCLUSION
The Daniel case has generated substantial discussion regarding the
need for and the propriety of amending ERISA so as to clarify the
relationship between employee benefit plans and the securities laws.
While pending legislation moves in that direction,134 it is useful to con-
sider on a broader scale the overall relationship between the securities
laws and employee benefit plans and to decide which agencies should
be responsible for the administration and regulation of employee bene-
fit plans. All indications are that the proper role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission should not be directed toward the employer-
employee (or union-employee) relationship, but rather should be im-
132. See, eg., Rule 16b-3(e)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(e)(3) (1978) (establishing, under some
circumstances, a "window" period for SAR plans during which such rights must be exercised if
the employee is to receive cash).
133. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 (July 13, 1970), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
FED. Snc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,837, revisedin Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,539, supra
note 93.
134. See notes 109, 123 supra.
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ited to those aspects of employer-employee benefit plans that do in fact
have an impact on the securities markets generally. In those areas, sev-
eral existing rules could be improved without adversely affecting the
markets. To move in that direction would be a great measure of pro-
gress.

